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Abstract 
We investigate whether trust in different financial institutions influences the choice of saving 
instruments. Is trust a significant determinant of household saving behavior? How does trust 
in different financial institutions affect the composition of household savings? Using unique 
survey data for ten emerging market economies in Central, Eastern and Southeastern Europe, 
we show that trust in the financial system increases the probability of holding formal savings 
and the diversification among formal saving instruments. Trust in the financial system and in 
foreign banks are significantly associated with holding contractual and capital market saving 
instruments. Trust in the safety of deposit has the largest positive effect on bank savings. 
Trust in domestic banks increases the likelihood of holding formal savings the most and trust 
in foreign banks decreases holdings of informal savings the most.  
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1 Introduction 
Household saving behavior is an important concern for policy makers because higher 
saving rates entail higher income growth (Beck, Levine & Loayza, 2000; Loayza, Schmidt-
Hebbel & Servén, 2000; Levine, 2005), mitigate economic shocks for individuals (Browning 
& Lusardi, 1996) and contribute to maintaining living standards over retirement (Benartzi & 
Thaler, 2013). The choice of formal saving instruments is also of high policy concern because 
it can have a direct effect on income and wealth inequality (Panizza, 2015) and investment in 
human capital (Karlan, Ratan & Zinman, 2014). Nonetheless, household choice of saving 
instruments is not thoroughly investigated in the extant literature, particularly in developing 
countries.    
The lack of national savings and strained state pension schemes have called for reform 
in many Central, Eastern and Southeastern European countries (The World Bank, 2014). 
These countries – like many – are characterized by ageing of society which drives up costs in 
the pension and healthcare systems, ultimately putting a strain on public finances and an 
emphasis on individuals’ saving behavior. Furthermore, the region is also characterized by 
high informal savings (Beckmann, 2016; Demirguc-Kunt et al., 2015). The domestic 
accumulation of financial resources through the formal financial sector is fundamental for 
economic development (Beck, Levine & Loayza, 2000) because for instance it allows to 
exploit more and larger investment opportunities and it fosters the growth of private sector 
firms (Ayyagari, Demirgüç-Kunt & Maksimovic, 2010). In this context, recent studies have 
highlighted how in Central, Eastern and Southeastern European countries, the lack of trust 
has favored cash preferences over formal savings (Stix, 2013; Brown & Stix, 2015). It 
follows that it is paramount for policy makers in this region to understand whether trust is a 
significant variable in the choice of saving instrument. 
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Is trust a significant determinant of household saving behavior? Does trust in different 
financial institutions matter for the composition of household savings? We answer these 
questions using unique household survey data for a sample of ten Central, Eastern and 
Southeastern European emerging market economies. We find that trust in different financial 
institutions is positively and significantly related to the likelihood to save formally. In line 
with this result, higher levels of trust imply a lower likelihood to hold informal savings. Trust 
in banks increases the probability of formal savings, particularly bank savings. However, 
trust in deposit safety has a stronger and differential impact than trust in banks on the 
probability to hold savings at banks. We find that households who distrust banks not only 
resort to informal savings but also to formal non-bank savings if they trust the stability of the 
financial system.  
The determinants of households’ saving behavior have been widely investigated in the 
economics literature, which shows that a large number of factors may affect households’ 
saving behavior. Our selected sample of emerging market economies allows us to bridge two 
themes of this research. Specifically, on the one hand previous research has shown that trust 
is an important determinant of participation in the stock market and risky financial assets in 
advanced economies; on the other hand, it has shown that lack of trust in banks is an 
important determinant of informal savings in transition economies and developing countries.  
Empirical evidence on households’ participation in capital markets is limited to 
advanced economies (Panizza, 2015) and shows that actual participation in capital markets is 
very low, especially in Europe (Arrondel et al., 2014). This lack of participation has inter alia 
been explained by trust in financial markets. The seminal paper by Guiso et al. (2008) 
investigates the role of general trust and shows that less trusting individuals are less likely to 
buy stocks. Similarly, El-Attar and Poschke (2011) advocate that lack of trust reduces 
investment particularly in risky assets. By the same token, Balloch et al. (2015) suggest that 
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stock market literacy and trust affect the probability of participation in the stock market and 
the share of investment in stocks. Delis and Mylonidis (2015) confirm the importance of trust 
and argue that happiness is another key driver of the decision to participate in stock markets. 
On the other hand, trust - or rather the lack of it - has been highlighted as one of the key 
determinants for non-participation in formal savings. Stix (2013) concludes that lack of trust 
and previous experience of banking crises explain the continuously high preference for 
saving in cash in transition European economies. Recent studies suggest that trust should be 
differentiated by type of financial institution. Jin et al. (2016) show that the proportion and 
likelihood of foreign ownership in listed firms in China increases with the level of social trust. 
Filipiak (2016) analyses savings patterns in India and conclude that geographic proximity is 
highly relevant for trusting different types of financial institutions.  
We contribute to the extant literature on household saving behavior by presenting 
evidence on household choice of saving instruments in ten emerging market economies. To 
the best of our knowledge, this is the only data set which simultaneously includes evidence 
on informal savings, bank, contractual and capital market savings. The novel feature of our 
study is to differentiate trust by type of institution, specifically disentangling trust in banks, in 
the safety of deposits and in the financial system. Thus we are able to link two strands of the 
literature – the importance of trust for capital market investment and the importance of trust 
for the choice of formal versus informal savings – pinning down the effect of trust on 
households’ choice among different saving instruments.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. First, we describe the data and 
variables (section 2), and the empirical design (section 3). Next, we present our results 
(section 4) and robustness checks (section 5). Conclusions are summarized in section 6. 
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2 Data and variables 
In this section, we outline our data (section 2.1), how we measure households’ saving 
behavior (section 2.2) and trust (section 2.3), and describe other relevant determinants of 
household savings (section 2.4). 
2.1 Data: OeNB Euro Survey 
The main data source for the analysis is the “OeNB Euro Survey” conducted by the 
Austrian central bank since 2007 on a regular basis as a repeated cross-sectional survey in ten 
Central, Eastern and Southeastern European countries: 6 European Union (EU) Member 
States which are not part of the euro area (Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Hungary, 
Poland, Romania) and four (potential) candidate countries (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
FYR Macedonia, Serbia).  
In each country and wave, a nationally representative sample of 1000 individuals aged 15 
years or older is polled based on multistage random sampling procedures. For the purpose of 
this analysis, we exclude respondents who are younger than 18 as these will probably lack 
experience in significant saving decisions. Data weighting is used to ensure a nationally 
representative sample for each country. Sampling weights use population statistics on gender, 
age and region and, where available, education and socioeconomic status as well as ethnicity.1 
We employ data from 2 surveys conducted in fall 2012 and 2013, as these two waves 
include all of our main variables of interest as well as a full comprehensive set of necessary 
control variables. Thus, our analysis focuses on 10 countries and around 20,000 individuals.  
                                                 
1 Further details on the survey can be found at: https://www.oenb.at/en/Monetary-Policy/Surveys/OeNB-Euro-
Survey.html. 
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2.2 Measuring household saving behavior 
We measure household savings behavior looking at the percentage of households that 
hold a diverse set of financial saving instruments conditional on having any savings.2 The 
central variables of our analysis are based on two questions reported in Table 1. 
< Insert Table 1 about here > 
Using the responses to the above questions, we employ six binary variables of 
households’ saving instrument choice: cash takes the value of one if the respondent has 
savings but only saves in cash; formal savings measures whether the respondent has any 
savings excluding cash; bank savings captures whether the respondent has savings in a 
savings deposit or current account; contractual savings shows whether the respondent saves 
using a life insurance or pension fund; capital market savings measures whether the 
respondent has stocks, mutual funds or bonds; finally, more than 1 formal savings indicates 
whether the respondent holds more than one of the above-mentioned saving instruments 
excluding cash. We consider cash as an indicator of informal savings as the amounts are 
saved outside the formal financial system.  
< Insert Figure 1 about here > 
Figure 1 shows the saving instruments held by respondents who currently have any 
savings. It suggests that the choice of formal versus informal saving instruments is negatively 
correlated and that bank savings and contractual savings are highly correlated. Table 2 
provides additional evidence on this descriptive results.  
< Insert Table 2 about here > 
As the question in Table 1 suggests, contrary to household wealth surveys, OeNB 
surveys contain information on the existence of savings and assets but not on the amounts. 
                                                 
2 For a discussion of measures of private savings, see Loayza and Shankar (2000). 
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Thus, percentages reflect participation rates only and not amounts invested in the respective 
assets. A further difference in comparison to household wealth surveys is that the 
questionnaire focuses on individuals rather than households. However, the questionnaire 
partly accounts for this issue by asking whether individuals hold financial assets alone or 
together with their partner. Moreover, in contrast to wealth surveys, we do not impute 
missing values but assume that non-response is random. For household income, we take this 
into account by including a dummy variable for those respondents who refuse to answer the 
question on income. Beckmann (2016) shows that the Euro Survey measures of saving are in 
line with aggregate stock and flow measures of household savings as well as indicators of 
household savings from the Global Findex (Demirguc-Kunt, Klapper, Singer & Van 
Oudheusden, 2015). In addition, previous analyses have shown that Euro Survey-based 
indicators provide an accurate match with aggregate data (see for instance Brown and Stix, 
2015).  
2.3 Measuring trust 
Trust has been defined as the confidence that money is safely invested. This 
encompasses two aspects. Firstly, the security that money will not be stolen. This is a concern 
even for those investors that operate in an environment where investor protection exists and 
law enforcement is high (see for instance Filipiak, 2016 and Gennaioli, Shleifer & Vishny, 
2015). Secondly, trust may vary depending on not only personal characteristics, but also on 
type of financial institution (Guiso et al., 2008; Stix, 2013). Therefore, we employ four 
indicators to capture the different level of trust in different financial institutions: trust in the 
safety of deposits, trust in domestically owned banks, trust in foreign owned banks and trust 
in the stability of the financial system in general.  
Figure 2 shows the percentage of respondents and their trust in the different financial 
institutions. Trust in the stability of the financial system is highest, followed by trust in 
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deposit safety. In all countries, except Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina and FYR Macedonia, 
trust in domestically owned banks is higher than trust in foreign owned banks.  
Although it is beyond the scope of this paper to analyze the determinants of trust itself, 
we shed some light on the interdependence of the different measures of trust to motivate their 
separate inclusion in the analysis (Table 3). First, looking at the multiple correlation 
coefficients, we notice that the measures are linearly interdependent, especially trust in 
domestically owned banks. Nonetheless, the non-parametric ANOVA statistic denotes that 
the measures convey different information as samples are not stochastically dominated. The 
results from the pairwise correlation analysis show that our measures of trust fall into two 
groups. Trust in domestic and foreign banks are strongly and positively correlated. The 
correlation between trust in the stability of the financial system and trust in deposit safety is 
the second “strongest” and stronger than the correlation between trust in banks and trust in 
deposit safety as well as trust in financial stability and trust in deposit safety.  
< Insert Table 3 about here > 
2.4 Other control variables 
We control for a rich set of behavioral and demographic characteristics as well as 
indicators of transaction costs. All our estimations include information on socio-
demographics which have been shown to influence the choice of saving instruments: age, 
gender, size of household, whether there are any children in the household, marital status and 
whether the respondent is in charge of managing household finances (Sunden & Surette, 1998; 
Love, 2010; Halko, Kaustia, & Alanko, 2012; Beckmann, Hake, & Urvova, 2013). 
Following Palia et al. (2014) we further control for factors affecting background risk – 
the labor market status, ownership of housing and private business. We also account for 
education and, in robustness analyses, for financial literacy (van Rooij, Lusardi & Alessie, 
2011; Balloch, Nicolaei & Philip, 2015). In addition, taking into account the findings by 
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Guiso et al. (1996), our estimations include information whether the respondent has a loan or 
plans to take out a loan.  
Karlan et al. (2014) highlight that inter alia transaction costs may hinder the adoption 
of formal saving products. Following Brown et al. (2015), we proxy for transaction costs by 
including geographic proximity to the nearest banks (see Beckmann, Reiter & Stix, 2016 for 
a detailed account on how these data are compiled). We further include information on light 
intensity at night which is a useful proxy for local economic activity (Henderson, Storeygard 
& Weil, 2012). 
Finally, following the recent paper by Balloch et al. (2015) we control for a wide range 
of behavioral characteristics including risk aversion, expectations and trust in other non-
financial institutions which allows us to isolate the effect of trust in financial institutions.  
Different country-specific institutional settings and cultural characteristics may exert a 
significant impact on the prominence and relevance of different savings motives (Loayza, 
Schmidt-Hebbel, & Servén, 2000; Grigoli, Herman, & Schmidt-Hebbel, 2014). Interacted 
country-survey fixed effects control for country-specific characteristics such as differences in 
deposit insurance schemes (Prean & Stix, 2011) and the presence of public pension schemes 
which may lower private saving rates (Le Blanc et al., 2015).  
The complete list of variables along with their definition and descriptive statistics 
appear in Table 4. 
< Insert Table 4 about here > 
3 Econometric specification 
We employ a probit model to determine the likelihood that households hold saving 
instruments. Conditional on having any savings, we relate trust and other determinants to 
indicators of different saving instruments, namely cash, formal savings, bank savings, 
contractual savings (life insurance or pension fund), capital market savings (stocks, mutual 
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funds or bonds) and a measure of diversification of the saving portfolio. For each outcome 
variable, we run separate regressions where we include each measure of trust separately along 
with a full set of control variables.   
In order to analyze which factors drive household saving behavior and the choice of 
saving instruments, we relate the indicators of saving behavior Sh,c of household h in country 
c, to measures of trust (TRUSTh) and household characteristics (Xh), controlling for country 
level determinants. We also include interacted country and survey wave fixed effects to 
account for dynamic changes at the country level between the two-surveys. Our model 
specification is as it follows: 
𝑆ℎ,𝑐 = 𝛽1𝑇𝑅𝑈𝑆𝑇ℎ + ∑ 𝛿𝑖𝑋ℎ
𝑖𝑛
𝑖=1 + 𝛼𝑐𝑤 + 𝜀ℎ,𝑐𝑤, ( 1 ) 
where households and countries are indexed by h and c, respectively; S is a variable 
associated to households’ saving behavior, namely formal savings, savings in cash only, 
banks savings, contractual savings, capital market savings, and more than 1 formal saving 
instrument; TRUST is a variable related to  trust in institutions, specifically in the stability of 
the financial system, in deposits safety, in domestic banks, in foreign banks and in central 
banks; X are the set of household characteristics; αcw are interacted country and survey wave 
fixed effects; ε are robust standard errors clustered at the primary sampling unit and time 
level.  
Given that a large fraction of households do not save, our regression might suffer from 
selection bias (Palia, Qi, & Wu, 2014). Following Shum and Faig (2006), we exclude 
households that do not have sufficient funds to save. We estimate probit models and calculate 
average marginal effects for participation in savings and saving instruments for each of the 
dependent variables.  
We check for the robustness of our results by estimating a Heckman selection model. 
Following Allen et al. (2012), we jointly estimate the probability of having savings and the 
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probability of holding specific asset categories. Selection equation (2) accounts for the 
incidence of having any savings:  
𝑃(𝐴𝑆 = 1) = Φ𝐴𝑆(𝛽1𝑇𝑅𝑈𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑆 + ∑ 𝛿𝑖𝑋𝐴𝑆
𝑖𝑛
𝑖=1 + 𝑢𝐴𝑆), ( 2 ) 
whereas the outcome equation (3) measures the choice of saving instrument, 
conditional on having any savings: 
𝑃(𝑆 = 1 | 𝐴𝑆 = 1) = Φ𝑆(𝛽1𝑇𝑅𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑆 + ∑ 𝛿𝑖𝑋𝑆
𝑖𝑛
𝑖=1 + 𝑢𝑆), ( 3 ) 
It is assumed that the error terms are normally distributed, 𝒖𝑨𝑺~𝑵(𝟎, 𝟏), 𝒖𝑺~𝑵(𝟎, 𝟏), 
with correlation 𝒄𝒐𝒓𝒓(𝒖𝑨𝑺 ,𝒖𝑺) = 𝝆.  
As our sample of countries is diverse, we further check for the robustness of our results 
by dropping one country at a time from the analysis. We also allow the effect of unobserved 
dependencies to vary by repeating the estimations with standard errors clustered at the 
regional and country level.  
4 Results  
Conditional on having any savings, we relate trust and other determinants to indicators 
of different saving instruments. For each outcome variable, we report separately the results of 
the regressions where we include each measure of trust one at a time along with a full set of 
control variables.  
< Insert Table 5 about here > 
How does trust in different financial institutions affect the probability to hold certain 
saving instruments? Table 5 reports the results for the relevant trust variables only.3 Trust in 
the stability of the financial system is positively related to the likelihood to hold formal 
savings and negatively related to informal savings (cash). The average marginal effect is 
stronger for holding more than one formal saving instrument (6.4 percentage points) and bank 
                                                 
3 The full set of results appears in Appendix. 
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savings (4.4 percentage points). Trusting the financial system also increases the likelihood of 
holding contractual savings and capital market savings. Furthermore, households are less 
likely to hold cash if they trust the financial system (decrease of 3.2 percentage points). 
Compared to trust in financial stability, trust in deposits safety has a stronger effect on 
the likelihood to hold savings with banks. The average marginal effect is higher than in the 
previous case (5.6 percentage points versus 4.4 percentage points) and the highest compared 
to the average marginal effects associated to the other saving products. Households are 4.0 
percentage points more likely to hold formal savings and 3.4 percentage points less likely to 
save in cash. We notice a decrease in the marginal effect associated with holding more than 
one formal saving instrument to 2.4 percentage points. Furthermore, the marginal effects for 
contractual savings and capital savings are not statistically significant. It follows that trust in 
deposits safety appears to be more related to the likelihood that households save at banks and 
save formally instead of incentivizing households to diversify across saving products. 
Marginal effects of trust in domestic banks on the different set of savings products 
confirm the same pattern noticed for trust in deposit safety. In this case the magnitude of the 
effects is lower except for the likelihood of holding formal savings that is now 4.3 percentage 
points. Interestingly, when we analyze trust in foreign banks, there is a significant impact on 
contractual savings (3.7 percentage points) and capital savings (1.8 percentage points). 
Moreover, both measures of trust contribute to decreasing the likelihood of holding informal 
savings (minus 3.2 and 3.6 percentage points for trust in domestic banks and trust in foreign 
banks, respectively). 
Setting the marginal effects into perspective with the sample probability of the 
respective dependent variable, shows that all the estimated effects are also economically 
significant.  
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We do not discuss results on the remaining control variables in detail but note that these 
are in line with previous research (Table A1). Education, employment and income 
significantly affect the choice of saving instruments. Indicators of wealth (ownership of 
further real estate) show a significant positive effect on participation in capital markets and 
diversification of formal savings. Furthermore, the choice of saving instruments is also 
determined by households’ indebtedness. Households with a loan are more likely to save 
formally, hold contractual savings and hold a diversified formal savings portfolio. Local 
economic activity as proxied by nightlight intensity positively affects the probability of 
holding bank savings and contractual savings. After controlling for local economic activity, 
physical access to financial intermediaries does not play a significant role for the decision to 
save in cash. However, households which live further away from a bank are more likely to 
hold contractual and capital market savings and diversify their saving portfolio. Finally, 
looking at behavioral characteristics we find that risk aversion does not affect participation in 
specific saving instruments. Trust in national and international institutions likewise does not 
have a significant impact with a notable exception. Respondents who trust the European 
Union are more likely to invest in capital markets and diversify their savings. Confirming the 
results of Stix (2013) and Brown and Stix (2015), we show that the experience of previous 
economic crises significantly affects the choice of saving instruments.  
< Insert Table 6 about here > 
To assure that these results are not driven by sample selection, we repeat these 
estimations using a Heckman selection probit model. Results, displayed in Table 6, confirm 
our previous findings and show even stronger effects of trust on holding cash, formal savings 
and bank savings. The selection bias turns out to be significant for contractual savings. This 
is likely related to the fact that life insurance in some countries is a prerequisite for taking out 
a loan and thus the distinction between “savers” holding life insurance and borrowers holding 
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life insurance is important. However, with the exception of contractual savings and holding 
more than one saving instrument, the selection bias is not statistically significant at the 10% 
level.  
< Insert Table 7 about here > 
Hitherto, we have focused only on how trust affects participation in each saving 
instrument separately. The interaction between trusts in different financial institutions may 
have a significant impact on the choice of saving instruments. In Table 7 we look at the 
saving behavior of respondents who state they do not trust banks (neither domestic nor 
foreign). For these respondents we find that if they trust in the stability of the financial 
system they are still significantly less likely to save in cash, significantly more likely to have 
formal savings and also bank savings. Interestingly, we also find respondents who distrust 
banks are significantly more likely to invest in contractual savings; and there is also a 
positive and significant impact on the likelihood of holding a diversified formal savings 
portfolio. This result suggests a substitution effect between formal saving products and shows 
that lack of trust in banks does not automatically lead to informal savings even in countries 
with a fairly recent history of economic turbulence and banking crises during transition. The 
results for trust in deposit safety indicate a significant role for government policies, especially 
for deposit insurance when trust in banks is low. Respondents who distrust banks are still 3.9 
percentage points more likely to save formally and 5.5 percentage points more likely to save 
at banks if they trust the safety of deposits.  
< Insert Table 8 about here > 
In a final step, we exploit the fact that respondents rank the various saving instruments 
according to the amount invested and investigate how trust affects the allocation of savings 
across saving products. Table 8 reports the results where the trust variables explain whether a 
specific saving instrument receives the highest allocation of savings. Our previous findings 
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hold and are even stronger if we focus on those cases where cash / bank savings constitute the 
most important saving instrument. For contractual and capital market savings the effect of 
trust turns statistically insignificant.  
5 Robustness tests 
Several robustness tests were conducted. In their recent paper, Balloch et al. (2015) find 
that trust and financial literacy are two distinct but simultaneous channels explaining 
participation in the stock market. While our data does not include indicators of financial 
literacy related to participation in specific savings instruments, we can nevertheless control 
for general indicators of financial literacy following Lusardi and Mitchell (2014). We do not 
include these in the baseline estimations because of the potential endogeneity with the choice 
of saving instruments. Table 9 shows that results for our trust variables are qualitatively the 
same after controlling for financial literacy. As expected, financial literacy is positively and 
significantly correlated with the probability of holding formal or bank savings.  
< Insert Table 9 about here > 
We use a number of alternative specifications to test the robustness of our results.4 The 
choice of saving instruments for households with loans may differ significantly from that of 
other households therefore we repeat estimations excluding respondent who have a loan. 
Furthermore, our sample of countries is fairly diverse hence we check whether the results are 
driven by a particular country by repeating the estimations excluding one country at a time. 
We also allow for the effect of unobserved dependencies to vary by repeating estimations 
with standard errors clustered at the regional and at the country level respectively. Finally, we 
utilize instrumental variable estimations to address the potential endogeneity of trust. 
                                                 
4 For the sake of space we do not report these additional estimations in the paper. The results are available from 
the authors upon request. 
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Specifically, we employ trust in the police as an instrument for trust in financial institutions. 
None of these changes in the model specification affect our main results.  
6 Conclusions  
In this article we empirically assess whether trust affects households’ saving behavior. 
Households’ saving behavior is defined as the percentage of households that hold a diverse 
range of saving instruments, such as cash, bank savings, contractual savings and capital 
market savings. We distinguish between trust in the stability of the financial system, deposit 
safety, domestic banks and foreign banks. 
We conclude that the set of trust measures significantly increases the likelihood that 
households hold formal saving instruments and decreases informal holdings. Household 
composition of savings shows a different magnitude of response depending on the trust 
measure. Trust in the stability of the financial system matters most for diversification 
increasing the likelihood to hold contractual savings (3.8 percentage points), capital market 
savings (2.2 percentage points), and jointly several formal saving products (6.4 percentage 
points). We also show that trust in the financial system and in foreign banks are significantly 
associated with household choice of contractual and capital market saving instrument. Trust 
in the safety of deposits has the highest average marginal effect for bank savings (5.6 
percentage points). Finally, trust in domestic banks increases the most the likelihood of 
holding formal savings (4.3 percentage points) and trust in foreign banks decreases the most 
holdings of informal savings (by 3.6 percentage points). We therefore conclude that trust in 
different financial institutions significantly affects household saving behavior. 
Savings are a safety buffer for individual households and can supplement public 
benefits in order to maintain adequate levels of overall welfare in old age. Preserving 
households trust in different financial institutions contributes to different allocative decisions 
and encourage households to save formally. Under-diversification of savings can entail a 
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large cost for middle-income households (Panizza, 2015) therefore policies that enhance trust 
in the financial system could lead to positive welfare effects. 
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Tables 
Table 1: Measures of household saving behavior 
This table reports the survey questions used to construct the variables for the choice of saving 
instruments. 
1) [ASK ALL] There are several ways in which one can hold savings. For example, one can hold cash, use 
bank accounts, have life insurances, hold mutual funds, pension funds, etc. Do you currently have any 
savings? Please refer to savings you hold personally or together with your partner.  
Yes / No / Don’t Know / No Answer  
2) [If 1=Yes] Please take a look at this card that lists various savings instruments – could you please select 
the ones you are currently using and rank them according to the amounts you have saved on the respective 
instrument.  
– Cash 
– Current Account / transaction account / wage card  
– Savings deposits / savings accounts (in foreign or in [LOCAL CURRENCY]) 
– Life insurance  
– Mutual funds  
– Stocks 
– Pension funds (voluntary contributions) 
– Bonds 
– Other (e.g. gold) 
– Do not know 
– No answer 
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Table 2: Spearman rank correlation of saving instruments 
The table reports Spearman rank correlations between the choices of saving instruments. * represents 
statistical significance at the 5% level. 
 
Cash 
Formal 
savings 
Bank 
savings 
Contractual 
savings 
Capital market 
savings  
Cash 1 
    Formal savings -0.91* 1 
   Bank savings -0.79* 0.87* 1 
  Contractual savings -0.25* 0.27* 0.08* 1 
 Capital market savings  -0.13* 0.14* 0.07* 0.22* 1 
 
  
22 
 
Table 3: Linear interdependence - Trust in financial institutions 
The table reports the multiple correlation coefficient, the p-value of the Kruskal-Wallis test and the 
Spearman rank correlation coefficients between the different measures of trust. We exclude from this 
analysis respondents that did not provide an answer or answered “do not know”. The column 
“multiple correlation” report the measure of how well a given trust measure can be predicted using a 
linear function of the remaining trust variables. Higher values indicate a higher predictability of the 
variable. The column ANOVA F-test reports the p-value of the non-parametric ANOVA model 
testing whether the trust variables originate from the same distribution. The null hypothesis is 
stochastic dominance between the samples. *represent statistical significance at the 5% level. 
  
multiple 
correlation 
ANOVA 
p-value 
financial 
stability 
deposit 
safety 
domestically 
owned banks 
foreign owned 
banks 
financial stability 0.52 0.00 1       
deposit safety 0.52 0.00 0.47* 1     
domestically owned banks 0.70 0.00 0.36* 0.37* 1   
foreign owned banks 0.68 0.00 0.33* 0.33* 0.67* 1 
 
 
Table 4: Variables definition 
 
Variables  Description 
Dependent Variables  
cash 
Binary variable derived from survey question presented in Table 1, takes on value one if respondent has savings but only 
saves in cash, zero otherwise.  
formal 
Binary variable derived from survey question presented in Table 1, takes on value one if respondent has any formal savings 
(current account, savings deposit, life insurance, mutual funds, stocks, pension funds, bonds), zero otherwise. 
bank  
Binary variable derived from survey question presented in Table 1, takes on value one if respondent has any savings using a 
current account or savings deposit, zero otherwise.  
contractual 
Binary variable derived from survey question presented in Table 1, takes on value one if respondent has any savings 
invested in a pension fund or life insurance, zero otherwise.  
capital 
Binary variable derived from survey question presented in Table 1, takes on value one if respondent has any savings 
invested in stocks, bonds or mutual funds, zero otherwise 
>1 formal 
Binary variable derived from survey question presented in Table 1, takes on value one if respondent has savings and holds 
more than one formal saving instrument (current account, savings deposit, life insurance, mutual funds, stocks, pension 
funds, bonds), zero otherwise 
cash highest 
Binary variable derived from survey question presented in Table 1, takes on value one if respondent has the highest amount 
of his/her savings in cash, zero otherwise. 
bank highest 
Binary variable derived from survey question presented in Table 1, takes on value one if respondent has the highest amount 
of his/her savings in a current account or savings deposit, zero otherwise. 
contractual highest 
Binary variable derived from survey question presented in Table 1, takes on value one if respondent has the highest amount 
of his/her savings invested in life insurance or pension funds, zero otherwise. 
capital highest 
Binary variable derived from survey question presented in Table 1, takes on value one if respondent has the highest amount 
of his/her savings invested in stocks, bonds or mutual funds, zero otherwise. 
  
Trust in financial institutions  
financial system stable 
Derived from question “Currently, banks and the financial system are stable in [MY COUNTRY].” Respondents could 
agree on a scale from 1 (strongly agree) to 6 (strongly disagree). Dummy variable, answers from 1 to 3 are defined as one. 
deposits safe 
Derived from question “Currently, depositing money at banks is very safe in [MY COUNTRY].” Respondents could agree 
on a scale from 1 (strongly agree) to 6 (strongly disagree). Dummy variable, answers from 1 to 3 are defined as one. 
trust domestic banks, trust 
foreign banks 
Based on question “I would like to ask you a question about how much trust you have in certain institutions. For each of the 
following institutions, please tell me if you tend to trust it or tend not to trust it. 1 means ‘I trust completely’, 2 means ‘I 
somewhat trust’, 3 means ‘I neither trust nor distrust’, 4 means ‘I somewhat distrust’ and 5 means ‘I do not trust at all’. (a) 
domestically owned banks (b) foreign owned banks”. Dummy variable coded as one if respondents somewhat or completely 
trust, zero else. 
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Variables  Description 
Other explanatory variables  
age, age squared Age of respondent, age squared of respondent.  
female Binary variable, one if respondent is female.  
1 person hh, 2 person hh 
Binary variables indicating size of household: 1 person, 2 persons, 3 or more persons. Omitted category: 3 or more persons 
household. 
children Binary variable, one if there are any children in the household.  
married Binary variable, one if the respondent is married.  
manages hh finances 
Binary variable based on the question “Who is in charge of household finances?” coded as one for answers “I am” and “I am 
together with my partner”, zero otherwise. 
Muslim Binary variable, one if the respondent is Muslim.  
income (refused, low, medium, 
high) 
Binary variables which take value one for each net household income terciles (high, medium, low). Sample values are used 
to construct terciles. For those respondents who did not give an answer an additional dummy variable is defined (refused 
income). Omitted category: income low. 
regular income in euro Binary variable; one if the respondent regularly receives income in euro. 
receives remittances 
Derived from answers to the question “Do you personally or your partner receive any money from abroad? E.g. from family 
members living or working abroad, pension payments, etc.?” Binary variable coded as one if answer is “yes, regularly” or 
“yes, infrequently”, else zero. 
employed, self-employed, 
retired 
Binary variable coded as one if respondent belongs to selected occupational category. 
education (secondary, tertiary) 
Binary variables; degree of education (tertiary level, medium level and primary education). Omitted category: Primary 
education 
risk averse 
Derived from question “In financial matters, I prefer safe investments over risky investments.” Respondents could agree on 
a scale from 1 (strongly agree) to 6 (strongly disagree). Dummy variable, answers from 1 to 3 are defined as one. 
loan 
Binary variable coded as one if respondent has a loan. Derived from the question “Do you, either personally or together with 
your partner, have any loans?” Answers are “No.” “Yes, my loans are solely denominated in foreign currency.” “Yes, my 
loans are predominantly denominated in foreign currency.” “Yes, about equal amounts of loans in local and foreign 
currencies.” “Yes, my loans are predominantly denominated in local currency.” “Yes, my loans are solely denominated in 
local currency.” 
plan loan 
Binary variable derived from the question “Do you plan to take out a loan within the next year and if so in what currency?” 
Answer “No” is coded as zero, answers “Yes, in local currency”, “Yes, in euro”, “Yes, in Swiss franc” and “Yes, in other 
foreign currency” are coded as one. Answers “Don’t know” and “No answer” are coded as missing. 
exp econ sit better 
Derived from question “Over the next five years, the economic situation of my country will improve.” Respondents could 
agree on a scale from 1 (strongly agree) to 6 (strongly disagree). Binary variable, answers from 1 to 3 are defined as one. 
log(nightlight) 
Proxy for local economic activity based on Henderson et al.(2012). Light intensity at night in a 20km radius around the 
centroid of the primary sampling unit where the household is located. This indicator is measured on a scale ranging from 0 
to 63; a greater value indicates higher light intensity. Data are from version 4 DMSP-OLS nighttime lights time series, 
satellite F18 for both 2012 and 2013.  
log(distance to bank) 
Distance from the centroid of the primary sampling unit where the household is located to the nearest bank branch. 
Calculated based on the bank branch data collected by Beckmann et al. (2016).  
25 
 
Variables  Description 
internet Binary variable, one if the respondent has access to the internet at home.  
own house, own other real 
estate 
Binary variables, one if the household owns its primary residence or other real estate.  
trust in government, trust in EU 
Based on question “I would like to ask you a question about how much trust you have in certain institutions. For each of the 
following institutions, please tell me if you tend to trust it or tend not to trust it. 1 means ‘I trust completely’, 2 means ‘I 
somewhat trust’, 3 means ‘I neither trust nor distrust’, 4 means ‘I somewhat distrust’ and 5 means ‘I do not trust at all’. (a) 
the government (b) the European Union”. Dummy variable coded as one if respondents somewhat or completely trust, zero 
else. 
financial loss during previous 
crises 
Binary variable based on question “If you think back in time to periods of economic turbulences that happened prior to 
2008, e.g. very high inflation, banking crisis or restricted access to savings deposits. At that time, did you personally incur a 
financial loss due to such events?” Answers “No, I had no savings then” and “No, I did not incur a financial loss.” coded as 
zero “Yes” coded as one.  
 
  
Table 5: Saving instruments and trust in financial institutions 
This table presents estimates obtained from probit models. Each specification represents a separate 
regression where we report the average marginal effects for trust variables only. We employ six 
dependent variables (cash only, formal savings, bank savings, contractual savings, capital market 
savings, >1 formal saving). All estimations include the full set of control variables reported in Table 
4 as well as country-time-fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the primary sampling and 
survey wave appear in parentheses. P(DepVar) denotes the sample probability of the respective 
dependent variable. N denotes the number of observations. *, **, and *** represent statistical 
significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 Dependent 
variable 
cash  formal  bank  contractual  capital  >1 formal 
Specification 1 financial system -0.032***  0.032**   0.044***  0.038***  0.022**   0.064*** 
 stable (0.012) (0.013) (0.015) (0.014) (0.009) (0.013) 
 Log-L  -1745.9 -1855.9 -2181.8 -1819.8 -975 -1630.8 
 P(DepVar=1) 0.16 0.81 0.76 0.23 0.07 0.18 
 N 4801 4801 4801 4801 4717 4801 
Specification 2 deposits safe -0.034***  0.040***  0.056*** 0.002 0.011  0.024**  
   (0.011) (0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.008) (0.011) 
 Log-L -1723.1 -1832.4 -2163 -1821.1 -972.5 -1631.4 
 P(DepVar=1) 0.16 0.81 0.76 0.23 0.07 0.17 
 N 4769 4769 4769 4769 4686 4769 
Specification 3 trust domestic 
banks  
-0.032***  0.043***  0.047*** 0.009 0.009  0.022* 
   (0.012) (0.012) (0.014) (0.013) (0.008) (0.012) 
 Log-L  -1763.1 -1872.7 -2203.7 -1837 -974.9 -1648.6 
 P(DepVar=1) 0.17 0.81 0.76 0.23 0.07 0.17 
 N 4830 4830 4830 4830 4745 4830 
Specification 4 trust foreign 
banks 
-0.036***  0.034***  0.040***  0.026*  0.018**   0.037*** 
   (0.012) (0.012) (0.014) (0.013) (0.008) (0.013) 
 Log-L  -1746.5 -1857.6 -2183 -1822.3 -961 -1630.4 
 P(DepVar=1) 0.16 0.81 0.76 0.23 0.07 0.18 
 N 4797 4797 4797 4797 4712 4797 
  
27 
 
Table 6: Saving instruments and trust in financial institutions - Heckman selection 
model 
This table presents estimates obtained from Heckman selection probit models. Each specification 
represents a separate regression where we report the marginal effects at the mean for trust variables 
only. We employ six dependent variables (cash only, formal savings, bank savings, contractual 
savings, capital market savings, >1 formal saving). All estimations include the full set of control 
variables of Table 4 as well as country-time-fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the primary 
sampling and survey wave appear in parentheses. N(selection) denotes the number of observations 
in the selection equation, N(outcome) denotes the number of observation of the outcome equation. 
P(DepVar) denotes the sample probability of the respective dependent variable. Rho denotes the 
correlation between the selection and the outcome equation. P-Value denotes the significance of 
Rho. *, **, and *** represent statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 Dependent 
variable 
cash formal bank contractual capital >1 formal 
Specification 1 financial  -0.040*    0.042**     0.057***    0.028***    0.007**     0.039*** 
 system stable  (0.016) (0.017) (0.019) (0.010) (0.003) (0.008) 
 Log-L  -5949.96 -7805.8 -8131.6 -7762.6 -6923.9 -7578.2 
 N(selection)  11179 11179 11179 11179 11179 11179 
 N(outcome)  4801 4801 4801 4801 4801 4801 
 P(DepVar=1)  0.16 0.81 0.76 0.23 0.07 0.18 
 Rho  -0.07 0.06 -0.16 0.93 0.6 0.99 
 p-Value  0.79 0.87 0.62 0.00 0.33 0.21 
Specification 2 deposits safe    -0.042***    0.052***    0.072*** 0.004 0.003    0.015**  
   (0.014) (0.015) (0.017) (0.009) (0.003) (0.007) 
 Log-L  -7615 -7724.3 -8054.7 -7707.4 -6863.7 -7521.3 
 N(selection)  11014 11014 11014 11014 11014 11014 
 N(outcome)  4769 4769 4769 4769 4769 4769 
 P(DepVar=1)  0.16 0.81 0.76 0.23 0.07 0.17 
 Rho  -0.11 0.06 -0.18 0.94 0.5 0.97 
 p-Value  0.71 0.88 0.59 0.00 0.37 0.03 
Specification 3 trust domestic    -0.038***    0.055***    0.060*** 0.01 0.002    0.014*   
 banks (0.015) (0.016) (0.018) (0.010) (0.003) (0.007) 
 Log-L  -7766.9 -7876.5 -8207.7 -7835.3 -6978 -7650.5 
 N(selection)  11276 11276 11276 11276 11276 11276 
 N(outcome)  4830 4830 4830 4830 4830 4830 
 P(DepVar=1)  0.17 0.81 0.76 0.23 0.07 0.17 
 Rho  -0.18 0.24 0.08 0.94 0.53 0.98 
 p-Value  0.53 0.61 0.87 0.00 0.32 0.06 
Specification 4 trust foreign    -0.044***    0.042**     0.049***    0.023**     0.005*      0.022*** 
 banks (0.015) (0.017) (0.019) (0.010) (0.002) (0.008) 
 Log-L  -7692.6 -7803.7 -8129.2 -7763.5 -6906.1 -7574.3 
 N(selection)  11174 11174 11174 11174 11174 11174 
 N(outcome)  4797 4797 4797 4797 4797 4797 
 P(DepVar=1)  0.16 0.81 0.76 0.23 0.07 0.18 
 Rho  -0.2 0.24 0.25 0.94 0.72 0.98 
 p-Value  0.47 0.60 0.72 0.00 0.38 0.02 
28 
 
Table 7: Distrust in banks and its interaction with trust in financial stability and 
deposit safety 
This table presents estimates obtained from probit models for the subsample of respondents who 
distrust banks. Each specification represents a separate regression. We employ six dependent 
variables (cash only, formal savings, bank savings, contractual savings, capital market savings, >1 
formal saving). All estimations include the full set of control variables of Table 4 as well as 
country-time-fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the primary sampling and survey wave 
appear in parentheses. P(DepVar) denotes the sample probability of the respective dependent 
variable. N denotes the number of observations. *, **, and *** represent statistical significance at 
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 Dependent 
variable 
cash formal  bank  contractual capital >1 formal  
Specification 1 financial system    -0.038**     0.037**     0.050**     0.042**  0.018    0.068*** 
 stable (0.018) (0.019) (0.022) (0.020) (0.015) (0.017) 
 Log-L                     -744.5 -790.1 -947.5 -771.1 -357.5 -649.2 
 N                         1936 1936 1936 1838 1579 1838 
 P(DepVar=1)               0.19 0.78 0.72 0.26 0.08 0.18 
Specification 2 deposits safe   -0.031*      0.039**     0.055*** -0.001 0.008 0.016 
                           (0.017) (0.018) (0.020) (0.020) (0.013) (0.017) 
 Log-L                     -734.1 -780.3 -940.6 -774.5 -356.1 -652.4 
 N                         1925 1925 1925 1828 1570 1828 
 P(DepVar=1)               0.19 0.78 0.72 0.25 0.08 0.18 
  
29 
 
Table 8: Trust in financial institutions and its effect on the amount allocated to saving 
instruments 
This table presents estimates obtained from probit models. Each specification represents a separate 
regression. We employ four dependent variables which take the value one if the respondent names 
the respective saving instruments as the most important in terms of amounts saved: cash highest, 
bank savings highest, contractual savings highest, capital market savings highest. All estimations 
include the full set of control variables of Table 4 as well as country-time-fixed effects. Standard 
errors clustered at the primary sampling and survey wave appear in parentheses. P(DepVar) denotes 
the sample probability of the respective dependent variable. N denotes the number of observations. 
*, **, and *** represent statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 Dependent 
variable 
cash highest    bank highest    contractual 
highest 
capital highest 
Specification 1 financial system    -0.058***    0.065*** -0.008 -0.003 
 stable (0.017) (0.018) (0.008) (0.005) 
 Log-L  -2888.2 -3066.9 -941.6 -314.3 
 Pseudo-R2  0.1 0.08 0.26 0.19 
 N  4801 4801 4801 3790 
 P(DepVar=1)  0.39 0.49 0.07 0.02 
Specification 2 deposits safe    -0.055***    0.070*** -0.011 0 
   (0.015) (0.017) (0.008) (0.005) 
 Log-L  -2868.2 -3049.7 -934.2 -309.1 
 Pseudo-R2  0.1 0.08 0.25 0.19 
 N  4769 4769 4769 3624 
 P(DepVar=1)  0.39 0.49 0.07 0.02 
Specification 3 trust domestic 
banks  
  -0.068***    0.077*** 0.002 0 
   (0.017) (0.017) (0.008) (0.005) 
 Log-L  -2916.2 -3087.3 -944.6 -311.3 
 Pseudo-R2  0.1 0.08 0.26 0.19 
 N  4830 4830 4830 3809 
 P(DepVar=1)  0.39 0.49 0.07 0.02 
Specification 4 trust foreign    -0.055***    0.035**  0.014 0.005 
 banks (0.016) (0.017) (0.009) (0.005) 
 Log-L  -2896.6 -3074 -939.9 -303.3 
 Pseudo-R2  0.1 0.08 0.25 0.19 
 N  4797 4797 4797 3650 
 P(DepVar=1)  0.39 0.49 0.07 0.02 
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Table 9: Trust in financial institutions and financial literacy 
This table presents estimates obtained from probit models. Each specification represents a separate 
regression. We employ six dependent variables (cash only, formal savings, bank savings, 
contractual savings, capital market savings, >1 formal saving). All estimations include the full set of 
control variables of Table 4 as well as country-time-fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the 
primary sampling and survey wave appear in parentheses. P(DepVar) denotes the sample 
probability of the respective dependent variable. N denotes the number of observations. *, **, and 
*** represent statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 Dependent 
variable 
cash formal  bank  contractual capital >1 formal  
Specification 1 financial system    -0.031**  0.031**  0.042***  0.036**  0.023**  0.062*** 
 stable (0.012) (0.013) (0.015) (0.014) (0.010) (0.013) 
 financially  -0.009    
0.017*** 
   
0.021*** 
0.006 -0.003 0.005 
 literate (0/3) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.004) (0.006) 
 Log-L  -1693.9 -1797.4 -2118.7 -1783.7 -965.4 -1601.3 
 N  4689 4689 4689 4689 4606 4689 
 P(DepVar=1)  0.16 0.81 0.76 0.23 0.07 0.18 
Specification 2 deposits safe   -0.034*** 0.038*** 0.052*** -0.001 0.011 0.022*   
   (0.011) (0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.008) (0.011) 
 financially  -0.007  0.015**  0.018*** 0.006 -0.002 0.005 
 literate (0/3) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.004) (0.006) 
 Log-L  -1670.4 -1774.3 -2100.5 -1781.2 -962.8 -1599.1 
 N  4652 4652 4652 4652 4570 4652 
 P(DepVar=1)  0.16 0.81 0.76 0.23 0.07 0.18 
Specification 3 trust domestic    -0.029**   0.040*** 0.043*** 0.004 0.01 0.018 
 banks (0.012) (0.012) (0.014) (0.013) (0.008) (0.012) 
 financially  -0.007    0.015**   0.018*** 0.006 -0.002 0.006 
 literate (0/3) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.004) (0.006) 
 Log-L  -1707.8 -1811.8 -2138.7 -1796.4 -965.3 -1616.3 
 N  4713 4713 4713 4713 4629 4713 
 P(DepVar=1)  0.16 0.81 0.76 0.23 0.07 0.18 
Specification 4 trust foreign   -0.034***    0.031**     0.034**     0.023*    0.019**    0.032**  
 banks (0.012) (0.012) (0.014) (0.014) (0.009) (0.013) 
 financially  -0.006    0.015**  0.019*** 0.005 -0.003 0.005 
 literate (0/3) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.004) (0.006) 
 Log-L  -1693.1 -1797.6 -2118.8 -1782 -951.5 -1598.8 
 N  4681 4681 4681 4681 4597 4681 
 P(DepVar=1)  0.16 0.81 0.76 0.23 0.07 0.18 
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Figures 
Figure 1: Participation in saving instruments 
This figure presents the percentage of savers who save using different saving instruments. Countries 
are denoted by the following acronyms: Bulgaria (BG), Croatia (HR), Czech Republic (CZ), 
Hungary (HU), Poland (PL), Romania (RO), Albania (AL), Bosnia Hercegovina (BA), Macedonia 
(MK) and Serbia (RS). Source: OeNB Euro Survey, 2012-2013. Note: All percentages are weighted 
by sampling weights. 
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Figure 2: Trust in financial institutions 
This figure presents the percentage of respondents who say they trust in (i) the stability of the 
financial system, (ii) deposit safety, (iii) domestically owned banks, and (iv) foreign owned banks. 
Countries are denoted by the following acronyms: Bulgaria (BG), Croatia (HR), Czech Republic 
(CZ), Hungary (HU), Poland (PL), Romania (RO), Albania (AL), Bosnia Hercegovina (BA), 
Macedonia (MK) and Serbia (RS). Source: OeNB Euro Survey, 2012-2013. Note: All percentages 
are weighted by sampling weights. 
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Appendix 
Table A1: Determinants of saving instrument participation 
In these tables we report the full results of the probit estimations in Table 5 where we relate 
household savings to trust variables and other determinants. *, **, *** represent statistical 
significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. 
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                             cash     formal       bank   contractual    capital   >1 formal   
age                        -0.008***    0.007*** 0.003    0.011***    0.004**    0.007***
                         (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
age squared                 0.008***   -0.007*** -0.004   -0.011***   -0.004**   -0.006** 
                         (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
Female                   0.007 -0.013 -0.008 0.008   -0.019*** -0.003
                         (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.007) (0.010)
1 person hh              0.021 -0.021 -0.018   -0.052** -0.006 -0.013
                         (0.026) (0.027) (0.029) (0.026) (0.019) (0.025)
2 person hh              -0.005 0.015 0.006 -0.007 -0.002 0.003
                         (0.015) (0.016) (0.017) (0.016) (0.011) (0.015)
children                 -0.007 0.005 -0.004 0.014 0 0.013
                         (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.010) (0.014)
married                     0.044***   -0.050***   -0.056*** -0.024 -0.011 -0.022
                         (0.016) (0.017) (0.018) (0.016) (0.011) (0.015)
manages hh finances      -0.023    0.033**    0.067*** 0.001 0.005 0.007
                         (0.016) (0.017) (0.018) (0.017) (0.013) (0.017)
Muslim                      0.061***   -0.070***   -0.086*** 0.045 0.034 0.032
                         (0.019) (0.021) (0.024) (0.033) (0.021) (0.031)
income refused           -0.002   -0.028*    -0.036** -0.001 -0.001   -0.029*  
                         (0.015) (0.016) (0.018) (0.017) (0.011) (0.015)
income low                  0.066***   -0.078***   -0.094***   -0.040**   -0.025**   -0.087***
                         (0.016) (0.017) (0.020) (0.019) (0.011) (0.017)
income medium               0.033**   -0.042***   -0.043***   -0.033**   -0.017*    -0.056***
                         (0.013) (0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.010) (0.014)
regular income in euro      0.056**   -0.050*  -0.025 -0.013 0.021 0.026
                         (0.025) (0.027) (0.030) (0.031) (0.018) (0.026)
receives remittances     0.007 -0.003 -0.009 0.018 0.002 0.008
                         (0.016) (0.017) (0.020) (0.020) (0.013) (0.019)
employed                   -0.053***    0.050***    0.054***    0.050*** 0.011    0.047***
                         (0.015) (0.016) (0.018) (0.018) (0.013) (0.018)
self-employed            0.012 -0.003 -0.001    0.046***    0.022**    0.039***
                         (0.015) (0.016) (0.018) (0.016) (0.011) (0.015)
retired                    -0.058**    0.052**    0.078*** -0.028    0.035** 0.021
                         (0.023) (0.024) (0.027) (0.026) (0.018) (0.026)
secondary education      -0.024    0.029*     0.046** -0.002    0.034**    0.042*  
                         (0.016) (0.016) (0.019) (0.022) (0.014) (0.022)
tertiary education         -0.070***    0.067***    0.074***    0.054**    0.060***    0.110***
                         (0.019) (0.019) (0.022) (0.023) (0.016) (0.023)
risk averse              -0.018 0.02 0.024 -0.004   -0.019*  -0.001
                         (0.016) (0.017) (0.019) (0.018) (0.011) (0.018)
have a loan                -0.032***    0.046*** 0.013    0.072*** 0.008    0.033***
                         (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.011) (0.008) (0.011)
plan a loan              -0.021    0.039*  0.014 0.021 0.008    0.031*  
                         (0.019) (0.020) (0.021) (0.017) (0.012) (0.017)
exp econ sit better      -0.016    0.022*     0.021*     0.025** 0.01    0.021** 
                         (0.011) (0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.008) (0.011)
log(nightlight)          -0.008    0.014*  0.014    0.016*  0.004 0.001
                         (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.006) (0.008)
log(distance to bank)    0.001 0 -0.002    0.007***    0.005***    0.005** 
                         (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
internet                 -0.022    0.034**    0.037**    0.045*** 0.015    0.056***
                         (0.014) (0.014) (0.016) (0.016) (0.012) (0.017)
own house                -0.007 0.018 0.029 0.013    0.023*  0.013
                         (0.016) (0.017) (0.020) (0.017) (0.014) (0.017)
own other real estate    -0.007 0.009 0.004 -0.006    0.038***    0.036***
                         (0.012) (0.013) (0.014) (0.013) (0.007) (0.011)
trust in government      -0.002 0.001 0.011 -0.003 -0.006 -0.004
                         (0.012) (0.013) (0.015) (0.014) (0.010) (0.014)
trust in EU              0.001 0 0.012 0.007    0.019** 0.019
                         (0.012) (0.012) (0.014) (0.013) (0.008) (0.011)
financial loss during previous crises   -0.042***    0.041***    0.036**    0.035***    0.038***    0.058***
                         (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.013) (0.008) (0.012)
financial system stable    -0.032***    0.032**    0.044***    0.038***    0.022**    0.064***
                         (0.012) (0.013) (0.015) (0.014) (0.009) (0.013)
Log-L                    -1745.9 -1855.9 -2181.8 -1819.8 -975 -1630.8
Pseudo-R2                0.19 0.21 0.17 0.29 0.2 0.27
N                        4801 4801 4801 4801 4717 4801
P(DepVar=1)              0.16 0.81 0.76 0.23 0.07 0.18
Table A1: Savings Marginal Effects - Trust financial system
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                             cash     formal       bank   contractual    capital   >1 formal   
age                        -0.008***    0.007*** 0.003    0.013***    0.004**    0.008***
                         (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
age squared                 0.009***   -0.007*** -0.004   -0.012***   -0.004**   -0.007** 
                         (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
Female                   0.004 -0.01 -0.006 0.007   -0.019*** -0.004
                         (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.007) (0.010)
1 person hh              0.03 -0.029 -0.031   -0.046*  -0.005 -0.011
                         (0.026) (0.027) (0.029) (0.026) (0.019) (0.026)
2 person hh              0.004 0.007 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 0
                         (0.015) (0.015) (0.017) (0.016) (0.011) (0.015)
children                 -0.003 0.004 -0.008 0.016 0.001 0.013
                         (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.010) (0.014)
married                     0.047***   -0.050***   -0.054*** -0.024 -0.01 -0.022
                         (0.016) (0.017) (0.018) (0.016) (0.011) (0.015)
manages hh finances        -0.027*     0.032*     0.068*** 0.001 0.005 0.009
                         (0.016) (0.017) (0.018) (0.018) (0.013) (0.017)
Muslim                      0.057***   -0.064***   -0.081*** 0.05    0.037*  0.033
                         (0.019) (0.021) (0.024) (0.034) (0.021) (0.033)
income refused           0.001   -0.027*    -0.037** -0.005 0.001   -0.027*  
                         (0.015) (0.016) (0.018) (0.017) (0.011) (0.015)
income low                  0.065***   -0.075***   -0.091***   -0.040**   -0.025**   -0.086***
                         (0.016) (0.017) (0.020) (0.019) (0.011) (0.017)
income medium               0.035***   -0.040***   -0.043***   -0.034** -0.016   -0.054***
                         (0.013) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.010) (0.014)
regular income in euro      0.059**   -0.053** -0.028 -0.015 0.022 0.024
                         (0.025) (0.027) (0.030) (0.031) (0.018) (0.027)
receives remittances     0.009 -0.005 -0.011 0.016 0.001 0.007
                         (0.016) (0.017) (0.020) (0.021) (0.013) (0.019)
employed                   -0.050***    0.051***    0.054***    0.049*** 0.013    0.048***
                         (0.015) (0.016) (0.018) (0.018) (0.013) (0.018)
self-employed            0.009 0.001 0.003    0.046***    0.022**    0.045***
                         (0.015) (0.016) (0.018) (0.017) (0.011) (0.015)
retired                    -0.061***    0.060**    0.088*** -0.025    0.037** 0.027
                         (0.023) (0.024) (0.027) (0.026) (0.018) (0.026)
secondary education      -0.025    0.033**    0.049*** 0    0.037**    0.041*  
                         (0.015) (0.016) (0.018) (0.022) (0.015) (0.022)
tertiary education         -0.073***    0.074***    0.081***    0.055**    0.064***    0.109***
                         (0.019) (0.019) (0.022) (0.023) (0.016) (0.023)
risk averse              -0.021 0.022 0.024 0.006 -0.015 0.01
                         (0.016) (0.017) (0.018) (0.018) (0.012) (0.018)
have a loan                -0.029**    0.044*** 0.011    0.071*** 0.007    0.034***
                         (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.011) (0.008) (0.011)
plan a loan              -0.022    0.036*  0.011 0.027 0.01    0.036** 
                         (0.019) (0.020) (0.021) (0.017) (0.012) (0.017)
exp econ sit better      -0.014    0.020*  0.02    0.032*** 0.011    0.027** 
                         (0.011) (0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.008) (0.011)
log(nightlight)          -0.008    0.015*  0.015    0.016*  0.004 0
                         (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.006) (0.008)
log(distance to bank)    0 0 -0.001    0.006***    0.004***    0.004** 
                         (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
internet                 -0.016    0.029**    0.033**    0.042** 0.013    0.053***
                         (0.014) (0.014) (0.016) (0.017) (0.012) (0.017)
own house                -0.003 0.015 0.029 0.011    0.023*  0.009
                         (0.017) (0.017) (0.019) (0.017) (0.014) (0.017)
own other real estate    -0.007 0.007 0.002 -0.007    0.038***    0.038***
                         (0.012) (0.013) (0.014) (0.013) (0.007) (0.011)
trust in government      -0.002 -0.001 0.008 -0.002 -0.008 -0.006
                         (0.012) (0.013) (0.015) (0.014) (0.010) (0.013)
trust in EU              0.005 -0.002 0.01 0.009    0.020**    0.022*  
                         (0.012) (0.013) (0.014) (0.013) (0.008) (0.011)
financial loss during previous crises   -0.047***    0.047***    0.042**    0.034***    0.039***    0.056***
                         (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.013) (0.008) (0.012)
deposits safe              -0.034***    0.040***    0.056*** 0.002 0.011    0.024** 
                         (0.011) (0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.008) (0.011)
Log-L                    -1723.1 -1832.4 -2163 -1821.1 -972.5 -1631.4
Pseudo-R2                0.19 0.21 0.18 0.28 0.2 0.26
N                        4769 4769 4769 4769 4686 4769
P(DepVar=1)              0.16 0.81 0.76 0.23 0.07 0.17
Table A1: Savings Marginal Effects - Trust deposit insurance
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                             cash     formal       bank   contractual    capital   >1 formal   
age                        -0.007***    0.006** 0.002    0.012***    0.004**    0.007***
                         (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
age squared                 0.008***   -0.006** -0.003   -0.012***   -0.004**   -0.007** 
                         (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
Female                   0.007 -0.013 -0.008 0.007   -0.020*** -0.004
                         (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.007) (0.010)
1 person hh              0.027 -0.031 -0.027   -0.049*  -0.013 -0.015
                         (0.026) (0.027) (0.029) (0.026) (0.019) (0.025)
2 person hh              -0.005 0.014 0.002 -0.003 -0.003 0.005
                         (0.015) (0.016) (0.017) (0.016) (0.011) (0.015)
children                 -0.006 0.004 -0.007 0.016 0 0.015
                         (0.013) (0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.010) (0.014)
married                     0.043***   -0.049***   -0.053*** -0.024 -0.012 -0.023
                         (0.015) (0.016) (0.018) (0.016) (0.011) (0.015)
manages hh finances      -0.025    0.034**    0.068*** 0.004 0.006 0.012
                         (0.016) (0.017) (0.018) (0.018) (0.013) (0.017)
Muslim                      0.059***   -0.068***   -0.084*** 0.044 0.033 0.03
                         (0.019) (0.021) (0.024) (0.033) (0.021) (0.032)
income refused           0.001   -0.028*    -0.039** -0.001 -0.001   -0.026*  
                         (0.016) (0.016) (0.018) (0.017) (0.011) (0.015)
income low                  0.068***   -0.079***   -0.096***   -0.042**   -0.025**   -0.091***
                         (0.017) (0.017) (0.020) (0.019) (0.011) (0.017)
income medium               0.036***   -0.045***   -0.048***   -0.033**   -0.018*    -0.056***
                         (0.013) (0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.010) (0.014)
regular income in euro      0.057**   -0.051*  -0.026 -0.014 0.022 0.024
                         (0.025) (0.027) (0.030) (0.031) (0.018) (0.027)
receives remittances     0.009 -0.004 -0.011 0.02 0.003 0.01
                         (0.016) (0.017) (0.020) (0.021) (0.013) (0.019)
employed                   -0.054***    0.052***    0.056***    0.052*** 0.011    0.049***
                         (0.015) (0.016) (0.018) (0.018) (0.013) (0.018)
self-employed            0.013 -0.004 -0.003    0.049***    0.021*     0.046***
                         (0.015) (0.016) (0.018) (0.017) (0.011) (0.015)
retired                    -0.056**    0.052**    0.080*** -0.021    0.035** 0.028
                         (0.023) (0.024) (0.027) (0.026) (0.018) (0.026)
secondary education      -0.022 0.025    0.040** -0.003    0.037***    0.038*  
                         (0.015) (0.016) (0.019) (0.021) (0.014) (0.021)
tertiary education         -0.068***    0.065***    0.071***    0.055**    0.063***    0.107***
                         (0.018) (0.019) (0.022) (0.023) (0.016) (0.023)
risk averse              -0.023 0.024 0.028 0.007 -0.011 0.014
                         (0.016) (0.017) (0.018) (0.018) (0.012) (0.018)
have a loan                -0.032***    0.046*** 0.011    0.071*** 0.008    0.034***
                         (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.011) (0.008) (0.011)
plan a loan              -0.025    0.039*  0.014 0.024 0.009    0.035** 
                         (0.019) (0.020) (0.021) (0.017) (0.012) (0.017)
exp econ sit better        -0.019*     0.024**    0.024*     0.031** 0.012    0.028***
                         (0.011) (0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.008) (0.011)
log(nightlight)          -0.008    0.014*  0.015    0.015*  0.004 0.001
                         (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.006) (0.008)
log(distance to bank)    0.001 0 -0.002    0.007***    0.004***    0.004** 
                         (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
internet                   -0.022*     0.035**    0.039**    0.045*** 0.015    0.058***
                         (0.014) (0.014) (0.016) (0.016) (0.012) (0.017)
own house                -0.011 0.022    0.036*  0.012    0.023*  0.012
                         (0.017) (0.017) (0.019) (0.017) (0.014) (0.017)
own other real estate    -0.006 0.007 0.002 -0.008    0.038***    0.037***
                         (0.012) (0.013) (0.014) (0.013) (0.007) (0.011)
trust in government      0.006 -0.011 -0.002 -0.003 -0.008 -0.009
                         (0.013) (0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.010) (0.014)
trust in EU              0.007 -0.01 0.004 0.01    0.018**    0.020*  
                         (0.012) (0.013) (0.014) (0.013) (0.008) (0.012)
financial loss during previous crises   -0.045***    0.043***    0.036**    0.033**    0.036***    0.053***
                         (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.013) (0.008) (0.012)
trust domestic banks       -0.032***    0.043***    0.047*** 0.009 0.009    0.022*  
                         (0.012) (0.012) (0.014) (0.013) (0.008) (0.012)
Log-L                    -1763.1 -1872.7 -2203.7 -1837 -974.9 -1648.6
Pseudo-R2                0.19 0.21 0.17 0.29 0.2 0.26
N                        4830 4830 4830 4830 4745 4830
P(DepVar=1)              0.17 0.81 0.76 0.23 0.07 0.17
Table A1: Savings Marginal Effects - Trust domestic banks
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                             cash     formal       bank   contractual    capital   >1 formal   
age                        -0.007***    0.006** 0.002    0.012***    0.004**    0.007***
                         (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
age squared                 0.007***   -0.006** -0.003   -0.011***   -0.004**   -0.006** 
                         (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
Female                   0.007 -0.013 -0.006 0.007   -0.020*** -0.002
                         (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.007) (0.010)
1 person hh              0.02 -0.026 -0.024   -0.047*  -0.006 -0.008
                         (0.026) (0.027) (0.029) (0.026) (0.018) (0.025)
2 person hh              -0.004 0.013 0.001 -0.005 -0.002 0.006
                         (0.015) (0.016) (0.017) (0.016) (0.011) (0.015)
children                 -0.007 0.005 -0.007 0.016 0.002 0.016
                         (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.010) (0.014)
married                     0.039**   -0.047***   -0.050*** -0.025 -0.011 -0.022
                         (0.016) (0.017) (0.018) (0.016) (0.011) (0.014)
manages hh finances      -0.021    0.030*     0.064*** 0.004 0.004 0.008
                         (0.016) (0.017) (0.018) (0.018) (0.013) (0.017)
Muslim                      0.058***   -0.067***   -0.083*** 0.047    0.034*  0.032
                         (0.019) (0.021) (0.024) (0.033) (0.021) (0.032)
income refused           0.001   -0.031*    -0.040** -0.005 -0.004   -0.031** 
                         (0.016) (0.016) (0.018) (0.017) (0.011) (0.015)
income low                  0.070***   -0.082***   -0.097***   -0.045**   -0.026**   -0.094***
                         (0.017) (0.017) (0.020) (0.019) (0.011) (0.017)
income medium               0.035***   -0.044***   -0.047***   -0.033**   -0.018*    -0.057***
                         (0.013) (0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.010) (0.014)
regular income in euro      0.057**   -0.047*  -0.023 -0.011 0.023 0.028
                         (0.025) (0.027) (0.030) (0.031) (0.018) (0.027)
receives remittances     0.011 -0.006 -0.012 0.016 0.003 0.005
                         (0.016) (0.018) (0.020) (0.021) (0.013) (0.019)
employed                   -0.055***    0.052***    0.058***    0.049*** 0.012    0.048***
                         (0.015) (0.016) (0.018) (0.018) (0.013) (0.017)
self-employed            0.013 -0.001 -0.001    0.052***    0.020*     0.046***
                         (0.015) (0.016) (0.018) (0.016) (0.011) (0.015)
retired                    -0.055**    0.054**    0.084*** -0.025    0.031*  0.023
                         (0.023) (0.024) (0.027) (0.026) (0.018) (0.025)
secondary education      -0.021    0.027*     0.044** -0.005    0.036**    0.038*  
                         (0.015) (0.016) (0.019) (0.021) (0.014) (0.021)
tertiary education         -0.069***    0.068***    0.076***    0.054**    0.063***    0.108***
                         (0.019) (0.019) (0.022) (0.023) (0.016) (0.023)
risk averse              -0.026    0.027*     0.032*  0.008 -0.013 0.014
                         (0.016) (0.016) (0.018) (0.018) (0.012) (0.018)
have a loan                -0.032***    0.047*** 0.012    0.071*** 0.009    0.035***
                         (0.012) (0.013) (0.014) (0.011) (0.008) (0.011)
plan a loan                -0.036*     0.048** 0.022 0.026 0.011    0.036** 
                         (0.020) (0.020) (0.021) (0.017) (0.012) (0.017)
exp econ sit better        -0.021*     0.027**    0.027**    0.032*** 0.012    0.029***
                         (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.008) (0.011)
log(nightlight)          -0.008 0.013 0.014    0.015*  0.004 0.001
                         (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.006) (0.008)
log(distance to bank)    0.001 0 -0.002    0.006***    0.005***    0.004** 
                         (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
internet                 -0.019    0.032**    0.036**    0.046*** 0.013    0.055***
                         (0.014) (0.014) (0.016) (0.016) (0.012) (0.017)
own house                -0.015 0.024    0.039** 0.011    0.024*  0.011
                         (0.016) (0.017) (0.019) (0.017) (0.013) (0.017)
own other real estate    -0.006 0.008 0.002 -0.008    0.037***    0.035***
                         (0.012) (0.013) (0.014) (0.013) (0.007) (0.011)
trust in government      0.005 -0.005 0.003 -0.007 -0.011 -0.01
                         (0.013) (0.013) (0.015) (0.014) (0.010) (0.014)
trust in EU              0.013 -0.011 0.001 0.001 0.013 0.01
                         (0.013) (0.013) (0.015) (0.014) (0.008) (0.012)
financial loss during previous crises   -0.047***    0.046***    0.037**    0.038***    0.038***    0.058***
                         (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.013) (0.008) (0.012)
trust foreign banks        -0.036***    0.034***    0.040***    0.026*     0.018**    0.037***
                         (0.012) (0.012) (0.014) (0.013) (0.008) (0.013)
Log-L                    -1746.5 -1857.6 -2183 -1822.3 -961 -1630.4
Pseudo-R2                0.19 0.21 0.17 0.29 0.2 0.27
N                        4797 4797 4797 4797 4712 4797
P(DepVar=1)              0.16 0.81 0.76 0.23 0.07 0.18
Table A1: Savings Marginal Effects - Trust foreign banks
